The reports on the Fukushima Daiichi Power Station accident from both the Government and the Diet committees have been released. Since the number is large, I will abbreviate the names of the organizations. There are reports from TEPCO, NISA, JANTI and RJIF (Note), as well as the government report to IAEA and a report by the Ohmae Kenichi team, just to name a few.There are so many that it is difficult to even skim through them all.

The objectives, viewpoints, and the conclusions stated in these reports are so varied that it is difficult to put them all in our minds. Some reports have assessments that are completely contrary to others. If these are all taken earnestly, it could lead to a tremendous amount of stress.

Similarly, many accident reports have also been released overseas. They are mainly from the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), The American Nuclear Society (ANS), American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME), Institute of Nuclear Power Operations (INPO), Office of Nuclear Regulation UK (ONR) and Autorité de Sûreté Nucléaire (ASN).

These overseas reports are basically rational, and address the facts and problems regarding the accident in a matter-of-fact manner. They explain the effects of the accident on nuclear power stations in their homeland as well as discuss improvement and reinforcement. There are also reports such as the one from ASME which proposes a novel concept of nuclear safety.

The overseas reports also have a different focus. Some reports consider the accidents as part of the overall damage from the tsunami disaster and praise the dedicated activities of the power station employees who were working in the heat of the accident. Since the authors of such reports were not directly involved in the accident themselves, they were probably able to write more objectively.

In contrast to this, in spite of all the available data, the reports in Japan hardly matched up as technical reports as there was little head-on technical study and more of background factors.

The Diet Committee report mentioned things that could not usually be pointed out by the general public, such as heavy intervention from the Prime Minister’s office or dysfunction of the regulations, etc., due to which it received a lot of publicity. However, it lost its distinction as an accident investigation report as it focused more on trivial matters and misunderstood the broader picture in the process. Forced logic was conspicuous in several places.

I am unable to accept that ‘Regulations are captives of operators’, being a person who has watched the relationship between both sides for the past 40 years. The fact would actually be the opposite. Leveraging this captive and concluding that the main cause of the accident was a man-made calamity are leaps of logic. Man-made calamities exist. However, they are secondary causes. If there had been no tsunami, the accident would not have occurred.

It is incomprehensible that it was not limited to the tsunami as the direct cause and that the earthquake was still regarded as a factor. For approximately 45 minutes up to the tsunami arrival, the power station was in order and was proceeding with the cool shutdown schedule. No abnormalities caused by the earthquake have been reported. The Government accident investigation committee has concluded the same as well. It’s just like falsely accusing someone without any evidence. It is a pity that all the courageous reports were looked upon as fake due to insufficient technical deliberations. One can’t help but suspect that the condition of becoming a ‘captive’ mentioned in the report actually existed within the committee.

The final report by the Government accident investigation committee is a revision of the interim report. The remarks by the chairperson of the committee were reputed well in the media. Most part of the summary was quite convincing. However, the main text was more like an interpretation of the power station equipment or a collection of daily reports about the accident, and was not presented as an accident report. The interim report needs to be revised based on the public comments as well. I have hopes for the report to turn into something that lives up to the name of Japan as the Government report.

RJIF published, early on, an outline of the accident, which the citizens were interested in knowing. It even became a bestseller. It can be said that those have sufficiently served their purpose.

Amongst the domestic reports, in terms of the verification of the accident data, investigation and analysis, etc., the report by TEPCO is the most reliable. However, they were one of the involved parties. They seemed to have had an underlying diffidence to shield themselves. The report ended up sounding weak.

To sum it up, compared to the overseas reports, the Japanese reports go over the accident at length, but despite having eye-catching words, they lack technical depth. For example, while the reports call upon the lack of risk management, none of the reports provide any specific proposal for building an emergency system as a nation.

Already a year and a half has passed since the accident. It is important that we revise the technical inconsistencies amongst the reports and send out a report from Japan that includes improvement measures covering technical matters, striving to dispel international skepticism and anxiety.

(Note)
TEPCO：Tokyo Electric Power Company
NISA：Nuclear and Industrial Agency
JANTI ：Japan Nuclear Technology Institute
RJIF：Rebuild Japan Initiative Foundation(a private committee)