Attachment

Deliberation structure and issues for examination by the "Nuclear Facility Investigative Taskforce in the Niigataken Chuetsu-oki Earthquake" under the Nuclear and Industrial Safety Subcommittee of the METI Advisory Committee for Natural Resources and Energy

Subcommittee / Working Group	Issues for examination	Specific issues	Meetings convened
Working Group on in-house fire-fighting and information liaison / provision in the Niigataken Chuetsu-oki Earthquake (Project Manager) Professor Hirotada Ohashi, Graduate School of Engineering, University of Tokyo	1.In-house fire-fighting	(1)Examining TEPCO's response and tasks in relation to this earthquake, and exploring an in-house fire-fighting system and future challenges for nuclear energy operators (2)Exploring an in-house fire-fighting system and fire-fighting facilities for nuclear energy operators	1st meeting: August 27 2nd meeting: September 20 3rd meeting: October 11 4th meeting: November 14 5th meeting: December 7
	2.Information liaison system within the plant operator	(1)Examining TEPCO's response and tasks concerning radiation leakage, and exploring nuclear energy operators' response system and tasks at the time of radiation leakage (2)Exploring an information liaison system for nuclear energy operators	
	3.Initial action and preparation system in emergency	(1)Examining TEPCO's initial action in this earthquake, and exploring tasks concerning the government's initial response system (including an investigation into facilities required for making the initial response system function properly) (2)Exploring a liaison system for local governments, national government and nuclear energy operators (including a system for gathering information that facilitates liaison)	
	4.Information provision to local governments and residents	(1)Investigating and exploring TEPCO's information provision to local governments and residents (2)Investigating and exploring the governments' information provision to local governments and residents (3)Examining and exploring easy-to-understand press releases by the government and TEPCO (conveying a sense of security and reducing adverse effects based on misunderstanding)	
Subcommittee on anti-quake structural designs (Chairman) Professor emeritus Katsumasa Abe of the University of Tokyo	1.Examining the research data of relevant organizations on this earthquake, observation data of the seismic motions and survey data used as design basis to determine why the seismic motions observed in this earthquake exceeded the design-basis seismic motions at the foundations of reactor buildings at the power station		(Subcommittee)(*) 13th meeting: August 24 <WG on plant structures> 5th meeting: September 13 6th meeting: October 23 7th meeting: November 27 8th meeting: December 25 <Joint WG on earthquakes, tsunami, geology and subgrade> 1st meeting: October 12 2nd meeting: December 5 3rd meeting: December 25 (*)Existing Subcommittee or WG before the Chuuetsu-oki Earthquake occurred
	2.Impact of this earthquake on the Kashiwazaki-Kariwa Nuclear Power Station	(1)Examining the earthquake's impact on plant buildings / structures that are deemed important in terms of anti-quake safety, and verifying their integrity (2)Examining the earthquake's impact on equipment and piping that are deemed important in terms of anti-quake safety (The Working Group on nuclear plant administration and assessment of facility integrity is in charge of assessing the integrity of equipment and piping that received force beyond the elastic region.) (3)Examining the earthquake's impact on other facilities (the facilities that the Working Group on in-house fire-fighting and information liaison / provision in the Niigataken Chuetsu-oki Earthquake has earmarked for the enhancement of anti-quake resilience.)	
	3.Issues that should be reflected to future anti-quake safety assessment of the Kashiwazaki-Kariwa Nuclear Power Station	(1)Examining the research data of relevant organizations on this earthquake to identify which undersea active faults should be reflected in defining the level of an earthquake that forms the basis of anti-quake designs (2)Examining the observation data of seismic motions in this earthquake, and findings on the investigation into why the observation data exceeded the design-basis figures at the foundations of reactor buildings at the power station, so as to identify issues that should be reflected in defining the design-basis seismic motion (3)Examining the analysis results of seismic data observed at plant buildings in this earthquake, to identify issues that should be reflected to anti-quake safety assessment of buildings, structures, equipment and piping that are deemed important in terms of anti-quake safety (4)Examining the findings of the study into the earthquake's impact on facilities deemed important in terms of anti-quake safety at the Kashiwazaki-Kariwa Nuclear Power Station, to identify issues that should be reflected to the improvement of anti-quake performance for plant facilities (5)Examining the findings of the impact study on other facilities, to identify issues that should be reflected to the anti-quake performance of plant facilities	

		(6)Summarizing the anticipated level of earthquakes and seismic motions that should be reflected to future anti-quake safety assessment at the Kashiwazaki-Kariwa Nuclear Power Station, anti-quake safety assessment and anti-quake performance improvement measures for the power station's facilities that are important in nuclear safety, and issues associated with anti-quake performance improvement for other facilities	
	4.Summarizing the insight obtained from this earthquake and examining issues to be reflected to other nuclear power stations from the perspective of anti-quake safety assurance for nuclear facilities		
Working Group on nuclear plant administration and assessment of facility integrity (Project Manager) Professor Naoto Sekimura, Graduate School of Engineering, University of Tokyo	1.Operation management immediately after an earthquake	(1)Assessing the operation management measures the utility implemented immediately after the earthquake, identifying tasks that should be addressed, and reflecting the knowledge to manuals as required a.Confirming the status of automatic shutdown (status of first scram, neutron flux fluctuations, and the operation / standby state of safety systems) b.Confirming the relevance of operation procedures c.Examining the operation management that led to the iodine detection in the exhaust stack at Unit 7 d.Examining non-conformity management regarding the release of leaked water at Unit 6	(WG) 1st meeting: September 4 2nd meeting: October 2 3rd meeting: November 1 4th meeting: December 11 <Sub-WG> 1st meeting: November 12 2nd meeting: November 27
	2.Assessment of facility integrity	(1)Grasping the status of plant facilities, examining what inspections are needed, and assessing the plant operator's facility inspection plan and its outcome (2)Examining the method for assessing facility integrity, and exploring judging criteria on the need for repair work (3)Examining the results of inspections and assessment, to explore the method for repair work (4)Identifying items that should be reflected to guidelines and criteria to be applied in individual stages of assessment	